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Political Strategies and Regime Survival in Egypt 
by Curtis R. Ryan 
 
ABSTRACT 
The article explores the durability of Egypt's republican executive leadership and 
examines the strategies of survival employed by the three presidential regimes of the 
country from 1954 to 2000. The presidential regimes of Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser, Anwar al-
Sadat and Husni Mubarak were compared. Strategic patterns of each president were 
identified under the concepts of containment, repression and external diversion. The 
article further shed light on the strategies of political survival which are common in other 
developing countries. It gave a view on the effect of these survival strategies on plans for 
change and development. 
 
ARTICLE 
Given the chronic instability that characterizes much of the Middle East and the "Third 
World", it is puzzling that Egypt has seen few changes of government since the 1952 
overthrow of the monarchy of King Farouk. Egypt has maintained and developed 
essentially the same state structure since 1952, with only two changes of chief executive-
and these transfers of power came about not as a result of a coup or revolution, but only 
upon the death of the incumbent president.1 In a country whose economic indicators 
seem constantly to point to imminent crises or even collapse, Egypt's apparent stability in 
government appears just as constantly to defy the odds.2  
This paper explores the unusual durability of republican Egypt's executive leadership by 
examining the strategies of survival employed by its three presidential regimes, that of 
Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser (1954-1970), Anwar al-Sadat (1970-1981), and Husni Mubarak 
(for the period 1981 to 2000).3 The paper compares the survival strategies of each of 
these three Egyptian governments over time, and identifies consistent strategic patterns, 
grouped here under the concepts of containment, repression, and external diversion.4 In 
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examining these strategic and tactical patterns of behavior, the purpose of the study is not 
only to shed light on politics and development in Egypt, but also to investigate strategies 
of government survival which may be generalizable to other developing states.5  
It is worth noting, however, that these three strategies do not exhaust the list of variables 
explaining regime survival. Other key issues include, for example, the question of the 
regime's performance in office. But a truly comprehensive study is beyond the scope of 
this or any single article, and I will therefore focus not on the more positive issue of 
regime performance, but on what amounts to the darker and more cynical side of politics-
not because it provides the only explanation, but simply because it is an under explored 
yet critical issue in Egyptian and Third World politics.  
As this study will demonstrate, stability and government survival in Egypt have been 
achieved more through short term survival strategies than through success in long term 
development planning. The implications of this are important not only for understanding 
government stability and survival in Egypt and elsewhere in the Third World, but also for 
understanding the limiting effect survival strategies have on otherwise ambitious plans 
for development and change. Lacking well-developed institutions with which to effect 
their plans for economic and social change, leaders in the Third World often focus on 
strategies aimed at a more immediate concern: their own political survival. Yet the very 
"success" of these survival strategies may undermine any efforts to establish institutions 
capable of building for the future, and just as importantly, may sow the seeds for the 
growth and perpetuation of security-states, with correspondingly limited potential for 
political liberalization or democratization in developing countries.  
EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL SURVIVAL STRATEGIES  
Studies of political development have devoted considerable attention to the role of the 
state as an autonomous force in its own right.6 However, this concept often obscures the 
tremendous amount of political activity and maneuvering taking place within the state. 
This paper shall focus, therefore, on the more specific institution of the presidency itself, 
that is, the executive leadership of the state. "The state", however, includes not only this 
executive but also inter alia bureaucracies, legislatures, judiciaries, public sector 
industries, and the military. As this paper will make clear, strategies of political survival 
involve not only maneuvers in relation to key groups in society, but also in relation to 
these other state institutions.  
The focus on presidential leadership is necessitated by the nature of the executive-
centered Egyptian political system and will facilitate generalization to other developing 
nations whose political systems are similarly characterized by centralized and virtually 
autocratic rule-including both military regimes and single-party dominant systems. In the 
Egyptian context, the durability and survivability of the Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak 
regimes benefitted from the uninterrupted historical development of a centralized 
bureaucratic system.7 Each regime, therefore, was able to build upon what Hudson has 
referred to as a "historical pattern of autocracy and bureaucratic control."8 And although 
many variables may help to explain the longevity of an executive's tenure, in Egypt or 
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elsewhere, this study will focus on some of the variables that can be deliberately 
manipulated by political leaders. These strategies of survival can therefore be seen as 
independent variables affecting the dependent variable of government survival. The three 
major strategies explored in this paper can be defined as follows:  
(1) Containment:  
Actions aimed at controlling, absorbing, or deflecting pressures and demands made on 
the executive. These actions include coopting key figures and social groups, preempting 
the maneuvers of political opponents, balancing key power centers against one another, 
and creating institutions to control-if not mobilize-the population.  
(2) Repression:  
Actions involving coercion and the use of force against opponents of the government. 
Specific tactics may include intimidation through surveillance of opponents, job 
dismissals and control of future hirings, arbitrary arrest, and overt physical violence.  
(3) External Diversion:  
Actions that aim to turn public attention away from unresolved problems in the economy 
and society. These often involve dramatic maneuvers in international affairs intended to 
restore legitimacy or to buy time, and include both those maneuvers in preemption of, 
and in response to, popular dissatisfaction.  
In the sections that follow, I will examine each of these strategies in detail by comparing 
each regime's use of them and its specific tactical variations upon them. Of the three 
survival strategies discussed here, containment subsumes by far the broadest variety of 
maneuvers, and it will therefore be necessary to devote relatively more attention to it than 
to the other two.  
CONTAINMENT  
Containment Under Nasser  
The essence of Nasser's strategy involved the paradoxical goals of preempting potential 
opponents and containing social groups, while simultaneously emphasizing political 
mobilization. Nasser emerged as the clear central ruler in Egypt following the 1952 
overthrow of King Farouk and the later successful showdown with the titular head of the 
new republic, Muhammad Naguib. By 1954 Naguib was ousted, the monarchy abolished, 
all political parties dissolved, and most political institutions of the pre-1952 era either 
destroyed or in disrepute. Nasser understood that lasting social change in Egypt, 
however, required not only the eradication of these pre-1952 institutions, but also their 
replacement with some new forms of mobilization and legitimacy.  
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Nasser made three attempts at building a nationwide institution for both preempting 
popular demands for participation and mobilizing the masses behind the regime, 
culminating in the essentially corporatist Arab Socialist Union (ASU).9 Before the 
emergence of the ASU, the two earlier attempts at institution-building included the 
Liberation Rally (1953-1958) and the National Union (1958-1961). In the case of both 
organizations, the goals of preemption and containment appeared to have been more 
important than those of mobilization and participation. Nasser attempted to move beyond 
the relative weakness of the Liberation Rally and the National Union with the 
construction of the ASU. The new structure's mission was indeed daunting: to thwart 
class conflict, to act as a counterweight to the military, and to mobilize the previously 
disenfranchised elements of society.10 Unlike its predecessors, the ASU was organized 
more strictly in the corporatist vein by dividing society into general occupational 
categories roughly paralleling Nasser's rhetoric of a national alliance of working 
forces."11 This alliance included workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the bourgeoisie. 
The only sector that remained outside the ASU domain was the military. 
The problem of dealing with the military led Nasser beyond this corporatist containment 
strategy toward the technique of balancing key centers of power against one another. For 
although Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak all ruled as civilians, each had a military 
background and was acutely aware that the ultimate power center in Egyptian politics 
remained that of the military. But while the army had helped make the 1952 coup 
possible, Nasser wasted little time in curbing any future threats from this, his own 
institutional base. He forced retirements of suspect officers and used the power of 
appointments and patronage. Nasser then entrusted the armed forces, the most powerful 
institution in society, to his closest friend, Abd al-Hakim Amir. This attempt at 
containing the potential threat of the military proved eventually to have the exact 
opposite effect.  
Amir enthusiastically pursued his military tasks, building the loyalty of the armed forces 
through extensive investments in arms and equipment. Further, Amir retained control of 
the promotion lists, using his power to place loyal followers in all top positions. The 
president soon came to fear that his most trusted lieutenant was too thorough in his 
efforts. Rather than helping to curtail the power of the military, Amir had ensured that 
both he and the armed forces would constitute the greatest threat to Nasser's rule. No 
longer able to deflate the military itself, Nasser opted instead for the strategy of balancing 
institutional threats within the state against one another, a technique which came to 
characterize his dealings with all top state institutions. The only institution with the 
potential to play this balancing role was the ASU, whose strength Nasser bolstered in 
order to make it "a civilian counter to the military."12  
Ironically, the success of this survival strategy also in turn produced a new threat-
necessitating yet another survival maneuver. The ASU came to be dominated by a new 
powerful figure in the person of the regime's top socialist ideologue, Ali Sabri. As head 
of the ASU, Sabri began asserting direct control over the labor unions and truly 
mobilizing the workers. In short, the ASU under Sabri was soon not merely containing, 
but also mobilizing, social forces which Nasser felt might pose threats to his regime. By 
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its very success, the ASU more than balanced off the military, and became a center of 
power in its own right. A more pluralist system might have prevented such 
preponderances of power, but in Nasser's Egypt, state power was concentrated in the 
military, the ASU, and the presidency itself. With the discrediting of the military 
following the disastrous 1967 war with Israel, the ASU alone rivaled the chief executive, 
leading Nasser systematically to curtail and undermine the ASU's power from that point 
until his own death in 1970.  
Containment Under Sadat  
While Nasser's style of containing opponents involved corporatism and balancing centers 
of power, Sadat's use of the same general strategy-containment-was characterized more 
by preemption, appeals to public legitimation, and an attempt at "controlled" political 
liberalization.13 The first of these maneuvers marked the style of Sadat's rule and 
emerged soon after he assumed power, when he already faced numerous threats.  
Unlike Ali Sabri or Abd al-Hakim Amir, Sadat had never been a "power center". He 
remained unobtrusive even when playing a public role, and thus never appeared to be a 
threat to Nasser.14 Yet now he faced challenges from a variety of powerful figures, each 
with an institutional base within the state. These power centers consisted of the personal 
fiefdoms of several key Nasserites: Ali Sabri, who had returned to the ASU; General 
Muhammad Fawzi in the armed forces; Sami Sharaf as Minister of State for Presidential 
Affairs; and Sha'rawi Gum'ah, Minister of the Interior and thus head of the intelligence 
services.15 At first, the various power centers allowed Sadat the presidency, presumably 
as little more than a figurehead, but they soon began to maneuver for the real reigns of 
power.  
Sadat's strategy for dealing with this plethora of threats-each of which appeared to have 
more power than he-proved to be a cornerstone of his policies for the next decade: the use 
of a dramatic and sudden preemptive move. In what became known as the "Corrective 
Revolution" of 1971, Sadat purged each of these key figures and hundreds of their 
associates from every significant organization within the state. Having removed the 
leadership of the military, the ASU, and the police and security services, Sadat was free 
to install his own loyal clients in each organization. Before making his decisive move, 
however, Sadat had quietly reached understandings with pivotal leaders in the armed 
forces to stay out of the way until the purge was complete.  
While still consolidating his power, Sadat initially continued the use of corporatist 
structures to contain social groups; but he liberalized these to some degree by allowing 
debate within the organizations. At the same time he moved to erode the power of the 
overarching ASU as a command center once and for all, and thus the interest groups 
previously subsumed under the ASU umbrella achieved a greater degree of autonomy 
than they had under Nasser.16 By 1977, Sadat had developed enough support to abolish 
all ASU organizations, to tolerate the emergence of political "platforms", and eventually 
to permit the legal formation of political parties.  
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Although Sadat proved adept at the politics of containment through preemption, he also 
made frequent recourse to sources of public legitimation for his policies. This included 
reliance on an obedient parliament to endorse his measures, as well as continual use of 
referendums.17 In addition, he cultivated an image of being the "believer president", and 
had the (government appointed) Sheikh of al-Azhar issue fatwas (religious rulings) 
endorsing his various policies as being in accordance with the Shari'a (Islamic law). Most 
frequent, however, was Sadat's use of referendums and plebiscites, either for his own 
reelection or to approve a specific government policy. In each case the result was an 
inevitable 99% rate of approval which Sadat declared to be a popular mandate for his 
actions. Eventually, however, the referendum-strategy lost credibility by being used far 
too often.18  
Before turning to political liberalization, Sadat made one major attempt at balancing his 
opponents against one another, an attempt that had drastic consequences in promoting 
Islamist militancy.19 Student demonstrations in 1972 and 1973, which were Marxist and 
Nasserist in flavor, prompted Sadat to balance the power of these left-leaning elements 
that dominated the university campuses. In a typically dramatic gesture, he released 
virtually all members of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) who had been 
imprisoned under Nasser and encouraged them to resume their propaganda as a 
counterforce to the leftists. But when Sadat eventually banned all Marxist and Nasserist 
organizations, he had left the Ikhwan and other Islamist groups as the only available 
vehicles for opposition. With the Marxists and Nasserists out of the way, the Islamists 
came to dominate almost all student associations in Egypt's universities, and soon set 
their sights on the Sadat regime.20  
But with the dismantling of central Nasserist organizations such as the ASU, there 
remained no real institutional vehicles either for opposition to, or support for, the 
government. Sadat attempted to address this institutional vacuum by initiating a multi-
party system in Egypt. As with Nasser's reliance on corporatist containment of social 
forces, Sadat's multi-partyism appeared to be intended more as an instrument for control 
of domestic pressures than as an authentic form of popular participation. Hence, while 
political parties besides Sadat's own National Democratic Party (NDP) were allowed to 
form, they were sharply curtailed in their efforts to voice real opposition to regime 
policies.21 Just as the preeminent concern with regime survival had prevented Nasser 
from ever permitting true popular mobilization in his socialist program, so Sadat too 
preferred the maintenance of an authoritarian structure with some democratic trappings 
over tolerance of genuine participation and opposition. Under both administrations, the 
great majority of Egyptians remained as "contained" bystanders to the dramatic political 
and economic overhauls of their society.  
Containment Under Mubarak  
It is against this dual heritage of Nasser and Sadat that Mubarak succeeded to the 
presidency following Sadat's 1981 assassination. Eschewing dramatic and risky gestures, 
Mubarak instead attempted to establish his legitimacy and ensure his administration's 
survival by turning to containment of political pressures through greater political 
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liberalization, economic reform, and strengthening the military as the key supporter and 
guarantor of the regime. Although Mubarak's Egypt could not be seen as a democracy in 
the western sense, the flow of political ideas was more open than it had been under 
Nasser or Sadat. Egypt was once again home to the most prolific array of newspapers and 
magazines in the Arab world, including publications from many political opposition 
groups-even the Islamists.  
Egyptians still had no real control over the choice of a chief executive, but they were able 
to vote in a series of parliamentary elections. The record here has been mixed: the 
elections were neither an outright farce nor were they completely unmanipulated. 
Egyptian elections serve as an outlet for political pressures and a forum for opponents to 
vent their frustrations, but are not permitted to threaten the government's tenure. In this 
way, Mubarak has allowed many potential opponents to work within the system rather 
than against it. The strategy achieved several goals: (1) it forced opponents to address 
real policy issues rather than simply condemning the government; (2) it brought many 
opponents out into the open where they could be clearly identified by the government; 
and (3) it gave the Mubarak administration a greater veneer of legitimacy. In sum, limited 
democratization allowed the government to contain political forces, and to divide 
opponents between moderate reformist and militant revolutionary tendencies. In dealing 
with the latter group, in particular, the regime made full use of its coercive and repressive 
capabilities.  
Prior to the 1984 elections, Mubarak's administration passed what one observer described 
as "a rather curious new election law," which established a system of proportional 
representation. In the Egyptian electoral system, a party needed 8 per cent of the national 
vote to qualify for representation in the Assembly. The 1984 law, however, added the 
unique twist that if a party failed to get eight per cent, all its votes were automatically 
added to those of the winning party-inevitably the ruling National Democratic Party.22 
The electoral law was later changed, and the eight per cent rule abandoned, following a 
1990 supreme court decision overturning the results of the 1987 balloting. While the 
1984 law had worked in favor of the NDP, it may not have been in its larger interest since 
these electoral procedures peripheralized and alienated most opposition parties, 
prompting alliances between groups that might otherwise have countered each other.23 
This was illustrated in the successful alliance of the New Wafd and the Muslim 
Brotherhood in 1984, and the later alliance of the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), Liberal 
Socialist Party (LSP) and the Muslim Brotherhood in 1987.24 While it is admirable that 
the Mubarak regime posted the 1984 turnout at its accurate 43%, rather than a Sadat era 
"100%", voter enthusiasm remained low.25 The opposition newspaper Al-Ahali even put 
the 1987 figure at as low as 14% (official estimates put it at 25%).26 Similarly grim voter 
turnouts persisted throughout the Nineties.  
Beyond attempts at greater political liberalization, and in contrast to Nasser and Sadat, 
Mubarak's efforts to ensure his own survival also involved bringing the military back in. 
While Sadat made conscious efforts to subordinate the army and demilitarize the state, 
Mubarak restored its privileged position in Egyptian society and welcomed it as a full 
partner to his regime.27 The military became more deeply engaged in infrastructural 
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development and other economic projects, allowing Mubarak to sidestep both the 
Nasserist public sector bureaucracy and the often-corrupt Sadatist private sector 
entrepreneurs who had most benefitted from Sadat’s Infitah policy.28 The army had, in 
effect, once again become the sole guarantor of the regimes survival. This became clear 
with the 1986 riots of police conscripts in the Central Security Forces (CSF), which 
required the regime to call on the army to intervene. When order had finally been 
restored, 107 people had been killed and 715 wounded.29 The riots made clear that 
Egypt's painful socio-economic troubles lay barely below the surface. They also made 
clear that the Interior Ministry was unreliable in protecting the administration-as the CSF 
fell under its jurisdiction, and thus its own forces were the source of unrest. In this 
context the preeminent position of the Egyptian army and Ministry of Defense was made 
manifest.30  
Mubarak attempted to cultivate the military as the most powerful constituency in Egypt, 
garnering its loyalty through extensive military spending, pay raises, and benefits. In 
addition, the military's role in development projects was aimed not only at economic 
growth itself, but also at keeping the almost half a million man force preoccupied.31 
Mubarak's policies thus had the paradoxical effect of liberalizing civilian domestic 
politics while also revitalizing the domestic role of the military.32  
 
REPRESSION  
In addition to containment strategies, Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak have all turned to 
repression in varying degrees throughout their presidencies. Of the three regimes, the 
Nasserist state most frequently resorted to repression of political dissent, justifying these 
actions in terms of protecting the gains of the revolution. The latter goal, as in many 
developing societies, was often sacrificed in favor of the first. Nasser demanded the 
power to have complete flexibility and room for maneuver-a goal that runs counter to the 
development of any real popular participation or of effective mass institutions.33 As a 
result, the Nasserist strategy in practice tended to be "anti-motivational", relying to a 
large extent on fear as a preemptive device to contain threats, and exercising outright 
coercion when this failed as a deterrent.34  
Under Nasser, the interior ministry and its associated intelligence and security apparatus 
played a continually decisive role in the maintenance of the government. As early as 
1954, the regime cracked down violently on the Muslim Brotherhood after one of its 
members attempted to assassinate Nasser. Arbitrary arrest remained a standard practice in 
Nasser's Egypt, in particular against members of the Ikhwan.35 Among the more 
dramatic episodes in this darkest side of politics, was the repression of a 1965 plot against 
the regime led by Islamist philosopher Sayyid Qutb.36 The police roundup resulted in the 
arrest of more than 18,000 Islamists with further arrests to follow. One estimate held that 
27,000 people had been arrested in a single day.37  
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Police surveillance and arbitrary arrest were pervasive features of the repressive 
apparatus of the Nasserist state-features which became more prevalent as the president's 
paranoia grew. This is not to suggest that no real challenges to Nasser's rule existed. To 
the contrary, these were quite real from both secular leftist and Islamic rightist quarters. 
Yet it is equally true that the increasing reliance on the intelligence-security apparatus 
began to feed on itself, as Nasser came to be surrounded only by "yes-men" whose 
importance to the president (and consequently their personal power) appeared to be 
predicated on their efficiency in continually uncovering plots against Nasser.  
When Sadat succeeded Nasser to the presidency, he pledged to destroy the power 
networks within the Nasserist state and to bring to an end the most notorious practices of 
the Nasserist intelligence apparatus: phone-tapping, torture, and arbitrary arrests.38 Yet 
although Sadat had purged the leadership of both the armed forces and the intelligence 
services (al-Mukhabarat), these institutions of coercion remained intact. Yet Sadat had 
pursued a policy of "relative demilitarization" compared to the Nasser years, in the hope 
that a weaker military would have a correspondingly reduced power potential within 
Egyptian politics.39 Despite these efforts to temper the role of the army, a series of riots 
in 1977 (against an IMF-sponsored austerity program) provided evidence to the Sadat 
government that it still needed a strong military. The armed forces had proven their 
loyalty and indispensability twice in the same year: by protecting the regime and 
restoring order after the food riots, and through their successful engagements in a four-
day border war with Qadhafi's Libya.40 Still, with the exceptions of such overt threats to 
national and government security, the principal instrument of coercion for Sadat was not 
the military, but the police and intelligence apparatus. The shadow of arbitrary arrest did 
not hover so constantly in Sadat's Egypt as it had under Nasser, but there were notable 
exceptions such as the periods of great civil unrest in 1977 and 1980-81. In these periods-
when the government was fighting for its survival-Sadat's administration could be as 
ruthless as Nasser's.41  
This became graphically apparent in the last year of Sadat's life, when he increasingly 
lost touch with his own people. The president's minimal tolerance for opposition had 
clearly reached its limit. Secular opponents were calling for more than cosmetic 
democratization, others were criticizing the separate peace with Israel, and militant 
Islamists were denying the very legitimacy of the Sadatist regime. In a context of 
increasing instability and sectarian violence in Egypt,42 Sadat instituted a series of 
measures to ensure his regime's survival. Sadat proclaimed himself prime minister as well 
as president, and used a referendum to permit himself to run for an unlimited number of 
presidential terms. To steal the wind from the sails of the Islamists, he also had the 
Shari'a legally adopted as the sole source of legislation.43 Finally, Sadat promulgated his 
infamous "law of shame", an elastic code that could be used against anyone who offended 
"national values".44  
In 1981 Sadat made the last of his dramatic attempts to sweep up all his enemies before 
they could act against him. This involved moving simultaneously against both Muslim 
and Coptic militants and activists. Shenouda III, patriarch of the Coptic church, was 
removed from his office. Sheikh Kishk, a populist Islamist preacher of national stature, 
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and Umar Tilmisani, spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, were both arrested.45 
Several thousand secular and religious opponents of the Sadat government were also 
arrested. In the context of Sadat's rhetoric about political liberalization these mass arrests 
were stunning, and were made even more so when they were followed by a lengthy 
televised "diatribe" during which Sadat announced that he had "a list of a further 15,000 
names."46 Its very existence on the line, the Sadat regime employed all the survival 
tactics in its arsenal, from preemptive maneuvers to outright repression and further 
intimidation. Within less than one month, Khalid Islambuli, the brother of one of those 
arrested, led the group that assassinated Sadat at a Cairo military parade.  
Having sat directly beside President Sadat when he was assassinated, Husni Mubarak 
(himself wounded in the attack) was well aware of the potential threat to his rule posed 
by revolutionary Islamism. Lacking both the charisma and nationalist credentials of his 
predecessors, however, Mubarak's position and survival appeared to be even more in 
question than that of Nasser or Sadat had been. Yet generally speaking, repression under 
the Mubarak regime was not as wholesale or indiscriminate as that of its predecessors, 
but the emergency laws, introduced in 1981 in response to Sadat's assassination, 
remained in place into the later 1990s.47 These measures were used to justify the Interior 
Ministry's continued coercion and repression against alleged Islamist militants.  
Government repression, in fact, increased in the 1990s, including raids on mosques 
alleged to be the loci of militant activities, resulting often in pitched street battles and the 
infrequent application of legal due process to the "militants". By 1992, the government 
and militant Islamists were waging virtually an all out war with each other. By the late 
1990s, the Mubarak regime appeared to believe that it had won the battle with the 
Islamists, yet major acts of terrorism continued especially against tourists and tourist sites 
throughout Egypt. With this conflict as a pretext, the state began to curtail more and more 
civil liberties. But as Eberhard Kienle has convincingly argued, the increasing use of both 
containment and repressive measures may have had as much to do with countering 
opposition to economic reform as is does with defeating the Islamist movement.48  
EXTERNAL DIVERSION  
In addition to attempts to contain or repress political pressures, each president of 
republican Egypt has also turned to external affairs in pursuit of legitimacy and, most 
importantly, to divert attention from domestic problems. Foreign policy, in short, has 
been of paramount importance in Egyptian domestic politics. Such linkages between 
domestic and international political realms are natural for governments that equate their 
own survival with national security.49 Domestic political pressures can thus easily be 
treated as national security crises, and the global stage offers an arena to which 
governments may divert domestic attention.  
Nasser set the precedent for Egypt's activist foreign policy and extensive involvement in 
international affairs. While the external focus was in fact in accordance with Nasser's 
professed view of Egypt's destiny in world politics-as the center of the Arab, Islamic, and 
African worlds-it also served as a diversionary tactic from domestic socio-economic 
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ills.50 Michael Cooper has suggested that the combination of weak state institutions and 
external political and economic pressures resulted in a "repeated configuration" in 
Egyptian politics requiring such diversions. Cooper identifies a cycle in which 
containment and even repression are insufficient to quell popular dissatisfaction when 
they remain unlinked to evidence of prosperity, and hence the regime turns to 
international affairs for diversions and perhaps even solutions to domestic problems.51  
Nasser's emphasis on pan-Arabism made this an obvious tactic. His flamboyant 
international style and adventurism elevated Egypt to the dominant role in the Arab 
regional system, and this unleashed a wellspring of national pride on the part of a nation 
which for centuries had been under foreign colonial domination.52 Nasser's foreign 
policy maneuvers imbued him with a remarkable amount of domestic popular support. In 
particular, his emergence as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement after the 1955 
Bandung Conference, his refusal to join the Western-oriented Baghdad Pact in favor of 
"positive neutralism:' and his nationalization of the Suez Canal all marked a distinctive 
and sovereign road for Egypt's future, uniting Egyptians behind their president. These 
early successes may have helped Nasser to weather later debacles such as the destruction 
of Egyptian forces in the 1967 Six Day War. Indeed, few national leaders could have 
carried on after such a devastating defeat.  
It was, in fact, through the prominence of international affairs that Nasser developed his 
lasting legitimacy among Egyptians and Arabs in general-a legitimacy so strong that it 
has long outlived Nasser himself and can be seen in the numerous "Nasserist" groups in 
the Arab world today.53 Nasser's linkage of domestic and international affairs may have 
given his regime a certain strategic flexibility in which the government could attempt to 
shift public focus from one arena to another, depending on the political fortunes in each.  
In contrast, when Sadat assumed the presidency he lacked the personal power base and 
popular legitimacy of Nasser, and the Egyptian state was increasingly incapable of 
keeping up with the welfare commitments of Nasser's socialism. Furthermore, Sadat's 
effort to tone down the rhetoric of pan-Arabism initially reduced some of the initial 
legitimacy he may have enjoyed as an original member of the Free Officers Movement. 
Nevertheless, he remained undaunted and chose to pursue a deliberately different strategy 
toward political and economic policy, and toward building his own government's 
legitimacy. The Corrective Revolution helped distance Sadat from the unpopular 
repressive excesses of Nasserism, while the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War gave Sadat, 
in the words of one observer, a "legitimacy bonanza."54 Due largely to this foreign 
policy maneuver, Sadat established for the first time his own legitimacy, in which he 
emerged from Nasser's shadow to be hailed as the hero of the crossing of the Suez canal.  
In his emphasis on economic liberalization and development, Sadat expanded the use of 
diversion as a strategy to include not only grand gestures on the world stage, but also 
manipulation of the unique nature of the Middle East regional political economy. He 
made great efforts to improve relations with Saudi Arabia in order to develop the 
symbiotic economic link between the two countries: oil-rich. Saudi Arabia exchanged its 
capital for abundant Egyptian labor. As a result, Sadat was able to ease the burden of 
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Egypt's increasing population and decreasing welfare resources by "defusing political 
unrest through emigration of labor."55  
While this officially-encouraged movement of a restive labor force to foreign oil fields 
helped reduce social pressures, the realities of Sadat's Infitah policies continued to 
generate further pressures at home. Although some segments of society had acquired 
great wealth under Infitah, many others failed to reap its rewards. Employees of Egypt's 
huge public sector, which continued to employ more Egyptians than any other area, were 
hard hit by spiraling inflation, given their fixed incomes. Inequalities increased and class 
gaps became more apparent with the conspicuous consumption of the new Infitah 
capitalists.56 As noted in the discussion of repression, popular discontent with the 
government exploded in 1977 following the implementation of an IMF austerity program. 
Rioting and vandalism swept Alexandria and Cairo, prompting Sadat to call in the army 
for the first time against Egyptian demonstrators since 1952. After the army had quelled 
the unrest with considerable force, Sadat quickly reinstated subsidies on staple foods and, 
predictably, held a new referendum to endorse his continued rule.57 In this crisis, 
however, neither containment nor repression tactics appeared to thwart domestic 
economic dissatisfaction or political dissent. Drawing on the Nasserist precedent of 
turning attention outward, and on his own flair for dramatic preemptive moves, Sadat 
announced to a stunned People's Assembly that he would go to Jerusalem.59  
While this and other such international political moves temporarily diverted popular 
attention, domestic social and economic problems remained unresolved. Like Nasser 
before him, Sadat tended to rely on international affairs to revive domestic support, and 
in this realm he did enjoy several successes. But the waves of popularity which followed 
the 1973 war, the journey to Jerusalem, and the 1979 peace treaty were all short-lived. In 
each case raised expectations were unmet, resulting in deep frustration. This was 
particularly serious after the formula linking peace with prosperity failed to produce the 
latter. The already noted social and economic problems simply became that much more 
glaring in the context of dashed hopes. By 1980, Egypt's domestic crisis and public 
disillusionment steadily eroded Sadat's legitimacy, a process which was completed with 
his resort to mass arrests and repression.  
Turning to Mubarak, we find that he has relied on the politics of containment and, when 
necessary, coercion in order to maintain his government. Unlike Nasser and Sadat, 
however, he is less inclined toward dramatic moves on the international stage. The 
absence of such gestures generated little enthusiasm for Mubarak's rule and allowed 
festering domestic issues to assume their real importance. Yet Mubarak did have a 
strategy: in both domestic and international affairs, Mubarak emphasized 
reconciliation.59 On the domestic front, this entailed direct meetings with opposition 
figures, including pardoning and receiving at the presidential palace many who were 
imprisoned under Sadat. In foreign affairs, Mubarak's slow and methodical diplomacy 
has had none of the dramatic successes of Nasser or Sadat; but neither has it resulted in 
any grand failures. Under Mubarak, Egypt maintained its relatively cold peace with Israel 
while also ending its period of ostracism in Arab regional politics. Almost immediately 
upon assuming the presidency, Mubarak set to work mending fences with the same Arab 
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and Islamic leaders whom Sadat had publicly called "dwarfs". Largely as a result of 
Mubarak's quiet diplomatic efforts, Egypt was readmitted to the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference in 1987, and in 1989 attended its first Arab League summit since its 
expulsion ten years earlier. By the 1990s, the headquarters of the Arab League had 
returned to Cairo. In sum, Mubarak's diplomacy restored Egypt to its place in the Arab, 
African, and Islamic worlds, and deepened its military and economic relationship with 
the United States. 60  
Mubarak's presidency therefore marked a departure from Nasser's and Sadat's proclivities 
for dramatic actions in international affairs. As a result, his foreign policy maneuvers 
have not had the same diversionary effects as those of his predecessors. The consequence 
of this has been even more critical scrutiny of his domestic policies and of Egypt's many 
socio-economic problems. Mubarak's low-key forays into international affairs may reveal 
a declining utility for this diversionary tactic in contemporary Egypt. Nonetheless, his 
dull-but-consistent successes may have built for the regime a reputation for competence, 
if not charisma, in foreign affairs.  
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COMPARING SURVIVAL STRATEGIES ACROSS THE THREE REGIMES  
Containment Compared  
In sum, each of the presidencies examined here shows a consistent pattern in attempting 
to contain pressures to its rule, with significant variations in tactics. The overuse of a 
tactic has, in fact, often limited its utility for the successor government. In Nasserist 
Egypt, containment strategies involved establishing corporatist structures designed to 
encompass virtually the entire society. Where centers of power were too great to be 
contained in this manner, Nasser turned instead to containment through balancing such 
centers as the military and the ASU against one another. For Sadat, the purging of 
Nasserist elements in the state involved the dismantling of corporatist structures whose 
utility may have already eroded along with their legitimacy in the public eye.  
To recapture public support and contain burgeoning pressures for pluralism in post-
Nasserist Egypt, Sadat turned instead toward political and economic liberalization. Yet 
the effort to contain pressures through political liberalization under Sadat and later 
Mubarak as well, met with considerable public cynicism (largely as a result of unfulfilled 
expectations regarding the scope of "democratization"). That cynicism was well-founded, 
as both Sadat and Mubarak appeared to see democratization less as a means of extending 
the base of political participation, and more as a way of containing opposition to their 
rule.61  
Repression Compared  
Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak all turned to repression of dissent, when various maneuvers 
intended to contain social and political pressures had proven ineffective. The case of 
Nasser's Egypt, however, illustrates the unfortunate tendency for the resort to violent 
coercion and repression to build on itself, to the point that it may develop into a strategy 
of the first instance rather than one of last resort. While the development of the Nasserist 
repressive apparatus appears to fit this model, the Sadat administration first broke with 
this pattern, only to return to it in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the regime was 
most besieged. Under Mubarak, Egypt opened up considerably, with a much shorter 
shadow of repression than before, although the use of coercion against dissidents by no 
means disappeared. In essence, the Mubarak strategy toward its most vocal opposition-
the Islamists-amounted to one of "divide and rule" by containing moderate oppositionists 
(including the mainstream Ikhwan) while violently repressing more militant Islamists.  
By the late 1990's, however, the regime was decidedly on the defensive, and by 
continuing to concentrate on the perceived Islamist threat to the regime's survival, the 
image of the Mubarak presidency remained for many Egyptians one of a besieged 
government whose policies on social and economic development amounted to running in 
place and little more. Yet Egyptians themselves were also divided in their attitudes 
toward the continued battles between the military-backed secular state and its Islamist 
opponents. For some, the previously unthinkable idea of an Islamic Republic of Egypt 
seemed a worthwhile experiment after almost half a century of rule by the Free Officers 
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and their descendants. For others, however, the spectacle of chaos and civil war in 
Algeria in the 1990's served to rally otherwise liberal elements behind the semi-
authoritarian state in its efforts against Islamism.  
External Diversion Compared  
Nasser and Sadat diverted domestic attention toward dramatic Egyptian involvement in 
regional and global affairs. Mubarak, by contrast, eschewed such maneuvers in terms of 
his tactics (and diversionary power), but he by no means rejected Egypt's activist role in 
international affairs. The regime, for example, played a key role in assembling the Arab 
component of the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq in 1990-91. And in terms of the Arab-
Israeli peace process, the Mubarak regime had carved out its place in the process as 
virtually the only participant whom all the antagonists could talk to. But this type of 
foreign policy involvement never quite approached the drama of the Nasser or Sadat eras, 
and hence never amounted to a real diversionary tactic for the regime.  
Diversion through manipulating the international involvement of one's government is a 
maneuver found in many countries in addition to Egypt. This may be an even more 
feasible route for governments in developing countries which, like Egypt, are considered 
to be of high geopolitical importance by various "great powers". It is important to note, 
however, that while useful in a short term sense, this domestic-international linkage is at 
best highly precarious in the long term, as domestic social and economic problems 
remain even after the dust has settled from the latest international crisis.  
CONCLUSIONS  
By examining strategies of survival, this paper has explored the durability of 
governments in republican Egypt since 1952. It has emphasized the utility of three 
general strategies, all of which exploit options that are subject to manipulation by 
political leaders, and all of which have implications for understanding four decades of 
relative political stability and regime durability in Egypt, as well as understanding similar 
phenomena in other executive-centered countries throughout the "Third World". Nasser, 
Sadat, and Mubarak have been quite consistent in their attempts to contain, repress, and 
divert political pressures.  
Thus each Egyptian president succeeded in consolidating his own power and developing 
the presidency as an institution, yet none succeeded in developing state institutions 
beyond the presidency. Each has reshuffled the make-up of organizations and agencies, 
but none has institutionalized major organizations and agencies in the strict sense of the 
term. As Migdal has argued, "keeping state leaders afloat may paradoxically have 
involved the systemic weakening of the state's agencies, a kind of de-
institutionalization."62 This is well-illustrated in the experience of Nasser's ASU, and in 
the later failures of both Sadat and Mubarak to follow through with true democratization 
and meaningful participatory politics.  
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Mubarak's great contribution to the development of Egypt might have been in breaking 
with this cynical pattern and pursuing a more genuine process of democratization. After 
the first ten years of his presidency, Mubarak had indeed pursued relatively more 
democratization than his predecessors, and relatively less repression. Yet his battle with 
Islamist militancy ran against the overall trend toward greater political liberalization, so 
that the survival strategies discussed above continued to dominate Egyptian political life. 
The danger is that the lack of development of state institutions, of political legitimacy, 
and of stable and effective means for real political participation help to perpetuate the 
basic insecurity of the regime and to limit its overall policy effectiveness. Most Third 
World countries are already confronted by a host of economic, social, demographic, and 
even environmental problems and obstacles to development. These hurdles, combined 
with weak state institutions and insecure leadership, encourage executives to pursue short 
term survival strategies to a greater extent than long term development strategies. The 
result is a vicious cycle of short term survival strategies perpetuating the conditions for 
still more of the same.  
Excessive reliance on the types of survival strategies discussed here bodes ill for the 
development prospects of many countries in the Third World. As this paper has 
demonstrated, a leader such as Nasser or Sadat may have a great vision, agenda, or 
ideological view aimed at change and development of the nation, yet the focus on 
government survival can easily become an obsession, tempering even the most ambitious 
plans for a better future. Political concentration on the short term and the immediate 
future all too easily loses sight of lasting development, with the result that executives 
may survive but the ultimate losers continue to be the people. 
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